In this paper, an empirical evaluation of three infer ence methods for uncertain reasoning is presented in the context of Pathfinder, a large expert system for the diagnosis of lymph node pathology. The inference procedures evaluated are (1) Bayes' theorem, a:ss um ing evidence is conditionally independent given each hypothesis, (2) odds-likelihood updating, ass uming evidence is conditionally independent given each hy pothesis and given the negation of each hypothesis, and (3) a inference method related: to the Dempster Shafer theory of belief. A decision-theoretic approach is introduced for evaluating the performance of ex pert systems. This approach, when combined with . a more traditional expert-rating methcx\ for evalua tion, provides insights about various components of the inference process .
I. · Introduction
Several years ago, before learning much about methods for reasoning with uncertainty, I and my colleagues began work on a large expert system, called Pathfinder, that as sists community pathologists with the diagnosis of lymph node pathology. Because the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief was quite popular in our research group at the time, we developed a inference method for our expert system in spired by this theory. The program performed fairly well in the opinion of the expert pathologist who provided the knowledge for the system.
In the months following the initial• development of Pathfinder, several of us in the research group began ex ploring other methods for reasoning under uncertainty. We identifi ed the Bayesian approach as a candidate for a new inference procedure. We realized that the measures of uncertainty we ass essed from our expert could be inter preted as probabilities and we implemented a new infer ence method-a special case of Bayes' theorem.
During this time, the expert was running cases . through the program to test the system's diagnostic perfor mance. One day, without telling him, we changed the in ference procedure to the Bayesian approach. After running several cases with the new approach, the expert exclaimed, "What did you do to the program? This is fantastic!"
This experience was and still is in sharp conflict with the beliefs of many researchers in the artificial-intelligence community. At each of the first three AAAI uncertainty workshops, one or more researchers argued that the par ticular inference method used does not significantly affect performance, at least in the context of large real-world systems. In this paper, a formal evaluation of the perfor mance of several inference methods is presented that con firms our early experience with Pathfinder and refutes the claim made at the workshops. Moreover, it will be shown that the Bayesian approach yields performance superior to that obtained with the other approaches in the domain of lYmph-node pathology.
In addition to describing the comparison, a new ap proach for evaluating the performance of expert systems will be introduced. This method, based in decision-theory, , compliments a more traditional expert-rating approach to system evaluation. Both the new and traditional ap proaches will be used in the experimental comparison of the inference procedures.
II. The Domain
AI researchers working on uncertain reasoning often com plain that the merits of one inference method versus those of another are evaluated on the basis of only theoretical considerations. Another complaint is that evaluations of performance are limited to small or artificial domains. This study is designed to address both of these complaints.
The Pathfinder program reasons about virtually all dis eases that occur in a human lymph node (24 benign dis eases, 9 Hodgkin's lymphomas, and 18 non-Hodgkin's lym phomas.) In addition, the program includes an exhaustive list of clues or features that can be used to help determine a diagnosis. Over 100 morphologic features or patterns within a lymph node that can be easily recognized under a microscope are represented. The program alsO contains over 30 features reflecting clinical, laboratory, immunolog ical, and mo' lecular biological information that is useful in diagnosis. Because this study focuses on only one domain, these results should not be extrapolated to other domains. All that will be demonstrated is that the use of different infer ence methods can affect performance in a real-world sys tem. Researchers interested in learning more about the relative merits of different inference methods are encour aged to begin similar investigations in other domains. The Inference Methods
The three inference methods evaluated are ( 1) a special case of Bayes' theorem, (2) an approach related to the parallel combination function in the certainty-factor (CF) model [Shortliff e and Buchanan, 1975] , and (3) a method inspired by the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief (Shafer, 1976] . All three approaches take a set of observations and produce a belief distribution over disease hypotheses based on the same expert probability ass ess ments. The second two approaches, however, deviate significantly from prob abilistic reasoning. All three approaches share the ass umption that the hypotheses represented by the system are mutually exclu sive and exhaustive. Furthermore, all three approaches ass ume that the diagnostic features are, in some sense, in dependent. The exact nature of independence varies from method to method and is discussed in the following sub sections. It should be noted that, during the development of Pathfinder, obvious dependencies among features were eliminated by clustering highly dependent features. For example, a pattern called necrosis is seen in many lymph node diseases. The size of necrosis (percent area of lymph node showing this pattern) and the distribution of necrosis are two strongly interrelated features, and both are imp6r tant for diagnosis. To remove the dependency, a single fea ture "necrosis size and distribution" was created which had the mutually exclusive and exhaustive values. "nonexten sive and focal," "nonextensive and multi focal," "extensive and ·focal," and "exten�Jive and multi focal." These values were created by taking the cross-product o( the vahies for individual features pertaining to necrosis size and necrosis distribution.
Before describing the inference methods, some defini tions and notation are introduced. The mutually exclusive and exhaustive disease hypotheses will be denoted by the symbol d with a subscript-for example, d ; . Similarly, the symbol f�t refers to the kth feature in the knowledge base. Each feature is assO ciated with a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive values. The ith value of the kth feature is denoted by VJ:i. A given feature and a value for that fea ture together constitute an ob.!ervation. 'The term f�tVI:o denotes an observation of the ith value for: the kth.feat�re. For the sake of brevity, a set of observations fl VH ••• f ... v ... , will be denoted by the symbol {. Finally; ; two conditional independence assumptions ass ociated with the inference procedures are introduced here for reference. The first as sumption is that evidence is conditionallY:: independent on disease hypotheses. Formally, the ass umption is that, for any combination of observations !I v1i •.. . In Vni, p(fi Vii · · · /nVni \d;) = p(ft Vti \d;) . · · P(/n V�; \ d;) ( 1)
The second ass umption is that evidence is.conditionally in dependent on the negation of the hypothesis. Specifically, for any combination of observations ft Vli ' ••• /nVni' p(ft Vti • • • fn 11ni \d;) = p(ft Vti jdj) · · · P(/n 11ni j d;)
(2)
Both Equations 1 and 2 apply to each disease hypothesis d;.
A. Simple Bayes method
The first inference method is Bayes' theorem under the as sumption that features are conditionally independent on the disease hypotheses (Equation 1). In particular, if ob servations e = It 11 1 i .•• In Vni are made, the probability of the jth disease is given by
This inference procedure will be called the simple Bayes method to emphasize the conditional independence as sumptions it embodies. Note that the only assessments required by this approach are the probabilities p(J�o: V&i ldi) for each combination of /It, V /c i , and d1, and the prior prob abilities p( di ) for each disease. The other two inference methods require the same assessments.
B.

Odds-Likelihood method
The second inference method begins with a form of Bayes' theorem under the ass umption that evidence is condition ally independent on both the hypotheses and on the nega tion of the hypotheses (Equations 1 and 2). Under these ass umptions,' Bayes' theorem for the jth disease given ob servations e. can be written
(4)
The ratio on the left-hand side and the first ratio on the right-hand side of Equation 4 are the posterior and prior odds of d;, respectively. In general, the odds of an event is just a simple monotonic transformation of the probability of the event, given by 0= 2... In the version of this inference method evaluated in this paper , the likelihood ratios are not assessed directly. Instead, the numerator, p( !J., V k i l d;) is assessed directly, and the denominator, p(fkvl:;\d; ), is computed using where p(fi. v · j d-) = p( fk v�c;) -p(f �:v�c; ld; )p(di) Thus, this inference method makes use of exactly the same ass essments as does the simple Bayes approach. The like lihood ratios were not assessed directly because our expert the directly assessed evoking strengths and replaced them with the calculated values 
1-p
where each probability ass ess ment p(f�rv�o;ld;) is given by the frequency FQ(d;, /II VIIi)• Equation 8 follows from Bayes' theorem and the assumption that diseases are mu tuall y exclusive and exhaustive. Equations 7 and 8 together provide a method for com puting the posterior degree of belief in each disease hy pothesis from the prior probabilities of disease, d;, and the probabilities of an observation given disease, p( fiv,;j d; ). These are the same asse ssments that are required by the two approaches described previously. It should be noted that the resulting belief distribution rarely sums to unity. This fact is not a problem conceptually, because the evalu ation metrics used in the experimental comparison do not require probabilistic interpretations for th� distributions. Nonetheless , the dist�;ibutions produced by this inference method were renormalized to one, so that during the eval uation process , our expert was not able to recognize them immediately as being nonprobabilistic.
Like the odds-likelihood appr;oach, the naive Dempster-Shafer method is related to parallel combination in the CF model. In fact, Equation 6 is exactly the parallel combination function for . positive or confirming evidence if certainty factors are identified with singleton mass ass ignments.
·
IV.
The Evaluation Procedure
The procedure for evaluating the inference methods is ou� lined in Figure 1 . Observations describing a lymph-node biopsy of a patient are presented to an inference method. The inference method, in turn, produces a belief distribu tion over the disease hypotheses. Finally, the belief dis tribution is compared with. the gold standard probability distribution using an evaluation metric. The process is re peated for each of the three inference methods. In this section, the gold standard and evaluation .metrics. are de fi ned.
A. The gold standards l A gold standard that is commonly used . to evaluate di agnostic systems is the true diagnosis [de ' Dombal et al., 1972) . Unfortunately, this gold standard'· cannot distin guish easily between a procedure that produces.good de cisions, and a procedure that, through a course of good luck, produces good outcome,. This gold standard can accurately identify methods that· produce good <:\ecisions only when a very large number of' cases are evaluated. · . The gold standards used in this study' are designed to identify good decisions when only a small number of cases are examined. The first is derived from. the probability 160 Scoring scheme distribution over diseases that the expert ass ess es using the same list of observations that is presented to the inference methods. The; second is similar, except that the expert also reviews the belief distributions generated by the three approaches. The first and second gold standards will be called the "descriptive" and "informed" gold standards, respectively. . .
.
A major"disadvantage of the descriptiv� gold standard with respect to the true diagnosis is that it cannot identify an inference procedure that produces decisions that are better than an expert. This is an important co ncern be cause individuals, including experts, often make mistakes when reasoning under uncertainty in the sense that they violate highly desired principles of reasoning [Tversky and Kahneman, 1974] .; The informed gold standard is included in the study to address this concern. This gold standard. however, still cannot identify an inference procedure that produces better decisions than an informed expert. In deed, an expert is unlikely to appreciate all of his errors in reasoning, and to adjust his ass essments accordingly, sim ply by observing the output of the three inference meth ods. A decision analyst would argue, for example, that a decision maker must make many iterations of the cycle comprising formulating assumptions,. ass essing probabili ties, and inspecting the consequences of the assumptions and ass ess ments before he can have any assurance that he is making a good decision.
An improved gold standard might result from such iterations with an expert. The principles of reasoning un derlying each inference method, however, are not identi cal. Oeveloping a gold standard corresponding to a good decision under the principles associated with one of the inference methods would tend to bias the results in favor of that inference method. Thus, although the descriptive and informed gold standards will fail to recognize infer ence methods that do better than an expert in certain situations, they are used in this study because they are not biased towards any inference method and because they are useful for identifying good decisions when only a small number of eases are examined.
B.
A decision-theoretic evalu�tion metric Two evaluation metric:s are used to compare the inference methods. One approach is based on direct ratings given by the expert. The other approach, described in this section, is grounded in decision theory. Although other authors have suggested similar approaches (for example, see Wise [Wise, 1986] ), the comparison described in this paper is, to the knowledge of the author, the first to apply deci sion theory to the evaluation of a large real-world expert system.
The fundamental notion underlying the decision theoretic metric is that some errors in diagnosis are more serious than others are. For example, if a patient has a viral infection and is incorrectly diagno8ed as having cat scratch disease-a disease caused by an organism that is killed with antibiotics-the consequences are not severe. In fact, the only nonnegligible consequence is that the patient will take antibiotics unnecessarily for several weeks. · If, however, a patient has Hodgkin's disease and is incorrectly diagnosed as having an insignificant benign disease such as a viral infection, the consequences are often lethal. If the diagnosis had been made correctly, the patient would have immediately undergone radio-and chemotherapy, with a 90-percent chance of a. cure. If the disease is diagnosed in correctly, however, and thus is not treated, it will progress.
By the time major symptoms of the disease appear and the patient once again seeks help, the cure rate with appropri ate treatment will have dropped to less than 20 percent.
A decision theoretic approach to evaluation recognizes such variation in the consequences of misdiagnosis. The significance of each possible misdiagnosis is assessed sep arately. More specifically, for each combination of d; and d;, a decision maker is asked, "How undesirable is the sit uation in which you have disease d; and are diagnosed as having disease d; ?" The disease d; is called the diagnosis and the preference assessed is called the diagnostic utility, denoted U;;. Details of the utility assessment procedure are discussed in the following section.
Once the diagnostic utilities are asses s ed, it is straight forward to evaluate each ofthe inference methods relative to the gold standards. The procedure for evaluation is shown in Figure 2 . First, observations for a case are pre sented to a inference method to produce a belief distribu tion over the disease hypotheses, denoted p,., in addition, the observations are shown to the expert, who then assesses the gold-standard distributions, denoted Pgold·
Next, a decision rule is used to determine the optimal diagnosis given each of the belief distributions. In many systems that employ methods for uncertain reasoning, a commonly used decision rule is to choose the hypothesis with the highest degree of belief [de Dombal et al., 1972 ] [Cleckner, 1985] . Formally, the optimal diagnosis dx,. for a belief distribution p,. is given by
• where arg max; returns the d; that maximizes the quantity p.,(d;). This rule for choosing the optimal diagnosis is applied to the belief distributions produced by each of the inference methods. Note that the rule does not require that the degrees of belief computed by an inference procedure have a probabilistic interpretation.1
The gold�standa.rd diagnoses are then determined.
These diagnoses are prescribed using a decision rule dif ferent from Equation 9. In particul ar , the gold-standard diagnosis asso ciated with the distribution p old is the di agnosis that maximizes the expected utility �f the patient under that distribution . More formally,
After the gold-standard diagnoses are determined rat ings for the two distributions can be computed. In' this decision-theoretic framework, the natural choice for a rat-1 For comparison, both Equations 9 and 10, with p old replaced by P••• Ill'<! applied to the simple Bayes approach. Th! application ?{ Equation 10 to the simple Bayes approach is jllStified becallSe the J�erence method produces a legitimate probability distribution over diseases.
found that likelihood ratios were much more difficult to ass ess than were conditional probabilities p(/.cVA:;IdJ) · It would be interesting to conduct a comparison similar to the one described in this paper using an expert who is willing to asses s likelihood ratios directly.
Johnson [Johnson, 1986} has demonstrated that the conditional-independence ass umptions embodied in Equa tion 4 typically are not compatible with the updating of n mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses, when n is greater than two. In particular, he has shown that con sistently updating more than two mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses under the conditional-independence ass umptions used to derive Equation 4 is possible only when each hypothesis is updated by at most one obser vation.
In Pathfinder, this highly restrictive condition re quired for consistent updating is not met. Each disease hypothesis is updated by many observations in the knowl edge base. As a result, Equation 4 produces an inconsistent probability distribution over diseases in which the posterior probabilities of disease do not sum to one. To circumvent this problem, the disease probabilities are renormalized af ter Equation 4 is applied to the evidence. This completes the description of the second approach, which will be called the odd8-likelihood method.
It should be mentioned that the odds-likelihood ap proach is closely related to the parallel combination func tion used in the CF model. In fact, it was shown that the multiplicative combination of likelihoo!l ratios seen in Equation 4 maps exactly to the parallel combination func tion when a certainty factor is identified with a simple monotonic transformation of the likelihood ratio (Beck erman, 1986]. Moreover, in MYCIN-the expert system for which the CF model was designed-certainty factors of mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets of hypotheses are renormalized to sum to unity [Shortliffe, 1974] . This form of renormalization does not correspond directly to the renormalization of probabilities in the second inference method, but it is similar in spirit.
C.
Naive Dempster-Shafer method
The third inference method has an interesting history. It was developed by researchers, including myself, who at the time knew little about methods for uncertain rea soning. As the method was primarily motivated by the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief, it will be called the naive Dempster-Shafe r method. It should be emphasized that the approach is fraught with difficulties, some of which will be addressed in Section VIII. Perhaps the exposition will serve as a warning to the uncertainty in AI community as to what can happen when a group of novice researchers attempts to cope with the conflicting uncertainty litera ture.
As members of a medical information-science group, we were familiar with the inference method used by INTERNIST-I, an expert system for the diagnosis of dis ease across all diseases in internal medicine (Miller, I982].
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The inference procedure used by INTERNIST-I incorpo rates two measures of uncertainty, an evoking strength and a frequency. An evoking strength for disease dj and obser vation /A: V A:;, denoted ES(d1 .!•v�r;), represents the degree to which the observation "evokes" or "confirms" the dis ease [Miller, 1982] . In contrast, a frequency for disease df and observation !1r v�:;, denoted FQ( dj, /1: v�:;), represents the "likelihood" of an observation given the disease (Miller.
1982].
Because we initially had planned to use the INTERNIST-I inference procedure, our expert assessed both an evoking strength and a frequency (on a contin uous scale from 0 _to 1) for each disease-observation pair.
Before we began programming the approach, however, sev eral members of our group argued that a more principled approach should be used to combine the measures of con firmation we had ass ess ed. In particular, they argued that the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief should be used to combine evoking strengths. 
The remainder of the mass, I-ES(d1,J�:v�r;), is assigned to 9. Mass assignments of this form follow the approach taken by Barnett ( This inference method produces a number between zero and one for each disease hypothesis.
At first, we ignored the frequencies provided by our expert. However, our expert kept insisting that his assess ments of frequency were much more reliable than were his ass essments of evoking strength. This led us to study the INTERNIST -I inference method more carefully. It became dear to us and to our expert that the assessed evoking strengths were closely related to the posterior probability of disease given an observation. Also, it became apparent that the assessed frequencies corresponded to the probabil ity of an observation given a disease. Thus, we discarded where R,. and Rgold denote the ratings for the inference method and gold-standard diagnoses, respectively. Note that the two ratings can be different only when the diag noses prescribed by the two distributions p, and P g old are not the same.
C. An expert-rating evaluation metric
In addition to the decision-theoretic approach, an expert rating method is used to compare the inference methods.
For each probability distribution, the expert is asked, "On a scale from zero to ten-zero being unacceptable and ten being perfect-how accurately does the distribution reflect your beliefs?" The ratings given by the expert are compared using standard statistical techniques. Note that gold standards are not explicitly elicited in this approach.
The expert-rating metric is used for two reasons.
First, expert-rating approaches have been used frequently in expert system evaluations. (See, for example, Cooper [Cooper, 1984] .) Therefore, it is useful to compare the approach with the decision-theoretic method introduced in this paper. Second, the expert-rating and decision theoretic approaches e":aluated different aspects of perfor mance and are complementary.
V. Utility Assessment
In this section, several important issues surrounding the ass ess ment of diagnostic utilities are addressed and details of the procedure for ass ess ment are described.
An important consideration in the ass essment of diag nostic utilities is that preferences will vary from one deci sion maker to another. For example, the diagnostic utilities of decision makers faced with the results of a lymph-node biopsy are likely to be influenced by their age, sex, and state of health. Consequently, the ratings produced by the decision-theoretic metric are meaningful to an individ ual only to the degree that their diagnostic utilities match those used in the evaluation.
For this experimental comparison, the utilities of the expert on the Pathfinder project were used. Our expert was chosen for two practical reasons. First, being an ex pert, he was reasonably familiar with many of the ramifi catioll8 of correct and incorrect diagnosis. Second, a good working relationship with him had been established during the construction of Pathfinder. In future experiments, it would be useful to generate a utility model using an expert clinician who mi ght have better insight into the preferences 163 of a "typical" patient making a decision based on the re sults of a lymph-node biopsy.
It is interesting to note that our expert, because he is an expert, had biases that made his initial preferences deviate significantly from those of a typical patient. For example, many sets of diseases of the lymph node cur rently have identical treatments and prognoses. Nonethe less , experts like to distinguish diseases within each of these sets, because doing so allows research in new treatments to progress. That is, experts often consider the value of their efforts to future patients. In addition, experts gen erally suffer professional embarrassment when their diag noses are incorrect. Also, experts are concerned about the legal liability asso ciated with misdiagnosis. In an effort to remove these biases, our expe' rt was specifically asked to ignore these attributes of utility. He was asked to imagine that he himself had a particular disease, and to ass ess the diagnostic utilities accordingly.
Another important consideration in almost any med ical decision problem is the wide range of severities asso ciated with outcomes. As mentioned previously, one mis diagnosis might lead to inappropriate antibiotic therapy, whereas another might lead to almost certain death. How can preferences across such a wide range be measured in common terms? Early attempts to resolve this question were fraught with paradoxes. For example, in a linear willingness-to-pay approach, a decision maker might be asked, "How much would you have to be paid in order to accept a one in ten-thousand chance of death?" If the decision maker answered, say, one thousand dollars, the ap proach would dictate that he would be willing to be killed for ten million dollars. Clearly, this is absurd.
Recently, Howard has constructed an approach that avoids many of the paradoxes of earlier models (Howard. 1980] . Like many of its predecessors, the model deals with determining what an individual would have to be paid to ass ume some chance of death, and what he would be will ing to pay to avoid a given risk. Also like many of its predecessors, Howard's model shows that, for small risks of death (typically, p < 0.001), the amount someone would be willing to pay or would have to be paid to avoid or to ass ume such a risk is linear in p. That is, for small risks of death, an individual acts like an expected� value decision maker with a finite value attached to his life. For signifi cant risks of death, however,· the model deviates strongly from linearity. For example, the model shows that there is a maximum probability of death, beyond which an indi vidual will accept no amount of money to risk that chance of death. Most people find this to be an intuitive result. � In this paper, the details .of the model will not be presented. For a discussion of the approach see (Howard. 1980 ]. Here, we need only to assume that willingness to buy or sell small risks of death is linear in the probabilitv of death. Given this assumption, preferences for minor t� major outcomes can be measured in a common unit, the 1 The result ignores consideratioM of legacy. probability of immediate, painless death that a person is willing to accept to avoid a given outcome and to be once again healthy. The undesirability of major outcomes can be asse ssed directly in these terms. For example, a decision maker might be asked, "'f you have Hodgkin's disease and are incorrectly diagnosed as having a viral infection, what probability of immediate, painless death woUld you be will ing to accept to avoid the situation and to be once again healthy?" At the other end of the spectrum, the undesir ability of minor outcomes can be ass ess ed by willingness to-pay questions, and can be translated, via the linearity result, to the common unit of measurement. For exam ple, a decision maker might be asked, "How much would you be willing to pay to avoid taking antibiotics for two weeks?" If he answered $100, and if his small-risk value of life were $100,000,000, then the answer could be translated to a utility of a 1 in 1,000,000 chance of death.
Thus, the only major task in asses sing the Ui;, aside from making the direct asse ssments themselves, is the de termination of the decision maker's small-risk value of life. Howard proposes a model by which this value can be com puted from other asses sments. A simple version of the model requires a decision maker to trade-off the amount of resources he consumes during his lifetime and the length of his lifetime, to characterize his ability to turn present cash into future income, and to establish his attitude to ward risk. However, our expert did not f i nd it difficult to asses s the small-risk value of life directly.3 When asked what dollar amount he would be -willing to pay to avoid chances of death ranging from 1 in 20 to 1 in 1000, he was consistent with the linear model to within a factor of 2, with a median small-risk value of life equal to $10,000,000.
Note that, with this utility model, the ratings R,, ass igned to the inference methods-will have units · "proba bility of death." In many cases, we shall see that the differ ences between ratings are small in the8e units (on the order of 0.001). Consequently, it is usefulto define a micromort, a one in one million chance of death. In these units, for example, a decision maker with a small-risk value of life of $10,000,000 should be willing to buy and sell risks of death at the rate of $10 per micromort. This unit of measure ment is also useful because it helps to emphasize that the linear relationship between risk of death and willingness to pay holds for only small probabilities of death.
Another important consideration is the complexity of the utility asse ssment procedure. There are 51 diseases represented in Pathfinder. The direct measurement of the U;; therefore requires 512 = 2601 assessments. Clearly, this measurement process would be tedious. Thus, sev eral steps were taken 'to reduce the complexity of the task. First, our expert was asked to establish sets of disease hypotheses that have identical treatments and prognoses. An example of such a set is the collection of nine types of Hodgkin's diseases represented in Pathfinder. Patients 3Howard &lao baa observed that the small -risk value oC life can be uaessed directly [Howard, 198 7 ) .
164
with any of the nine types receive the same treatment and have the same prognosis. 4 Our expert identified 26 such "equivalence classes," reducing the number of direct utility asses s ments required to 262 = 676.
Next, our expert was asked to order the utilities Uii he was asked to order the undesirability of having each disease and being diagnosed correctly. After he had com pleted this ranking, he was asked to quantitate each U;; in the manner described previously. It should be noted that the ordering of the uii was modified significantly during this process. About halfway through the procedure, he ex claimed, "The dollar is forcing me to think very carefully!" It would be interesting to determine whether most people respond in this way. The results of such a study wo uld be interesting, particularly to researchers in qualitative rea soning.
Finally, the off-diagonal utilities were ass essed. For each disease, our expert was asked to quantify the unde sirability of having the disease and being diagnosed as hav ing a different disease. First, he identified the most sim ilar preexisting asse ssment. It was then a simple matter to identify the differences between the current ass essment and the preexisting assessment, and to modify the util ity appropriately. For example, given a patient with the disease sinus • hyperplasia, the only difference between her being diagnosed correctly. and her being diagnosed with cat scratch disease is that, in the latter case, the patient would take antibiotics unnecessarily for SE!veral week s. Our expert said that he would be willing to pay $100 to avoid taking the antibiotics, so this value (converted to micrQ morts) was subtracted from the utility of being correctly diagnosed with sinus hyperplasia.
VI. Details of the Experhnent
Whenever possible, the conditions of the experimental comparison were arranged to mimic the conditions under which Pathfinder would be used in clinical practice. For example, Pathfinder is expected to be used by community hospital pathologists to ass ist them in diagnosing challeng ing lymph-node cases. Currently, when a community hos pital pathologist gets a difficult case, he refers the case to an expert, such as the expert on the Pathfinder project. Therefore, the cases selected for this experiment we re cho sen from a large library of cases referred to our expert from community pathologists. Relatively old cases (older than four months). were selected to decrease the chance that the memory of our expert would inf l uence the results. Twenty-six cases were selected at random from the referral library such that no two diagnoses were the same. Repeat diagnoses were not allowed so that the inference methods would be evaluated 'over a larger portion of the lrmph node knowledge base. To account for the fact that some diseases are much more likely to occur than others,
•Prognosia for these nine typea of Hodgkin's disease is detennined by the clinical stage, not by the specific type of disease. Although the cases were selected at random, a post experiment analysis showed that the cases were more chal lenging than a set of average cases would be. Our �ert reported that 50 percent of the cases contained many more technical imperfections (such as tears and poor preservation) than is usual. He also thought that 70 percent of the cases were more diffi cult to diagnose than the aver age ease. The deviation from normal probably occurred because the case-selection process favored the inclusion of rare diagnoses ..
A pathology resident entered the observations fo r each case into a computer database after examining lymph-node biopsies through a microscope. A pathology resident was used for two reasons. First, our expert could not be allowed to look at the lymph nodes slides directly, because he would observe more information than is presented to the inference methods. In addition, the expertise of a resident closely the system recommended to be evaluated. Once fe ature values had been identified for each case, they were presented to the three inference methods, pro ducing three belief distributions. Our expert was then given two evaluation sheets for each case. The first sheet included a list of the observations identified by the resident, as well as list of all the disease hypotheses represented in Pathfinder. The expert was asked to ass ign a probabil ity distribution to the diseases based on the observations given . The descriptive gold standard was derived from this distribution. The second sheet was identical to the first, excep t that it included the distributions produced by the three inference methods. The distributions were displayed in columns in a random order for each case. Our expert was asked to rate each belief distribution using the 0 to 10 5In pa&hology, several methods are Wled to establish a true cll ag· noeis. In some caae e , a cll agnosis is established through the u.e of expeu.ive teat.s. In other cues, a cll agnosia it established through obeervation of the time coune of a pa&ient 'a illneu. In still other cues, a cll agnoeia can be established only by an expert pathologist examining ti'lll ue sections under a microsc:ope. In tbis study, all three approaches, inclucll ng combined approaches, were' uaed. scale described earlier, and again to assign a probability distribution to the diseases. He was allowed to refer to his first probability distribution during the second assignment. The informed gold standard was derived from this second distribution.
In two of the twenty-six cases, our expert fo und the lists of observations confusing . Also, in these same two eases, the simple Bayes and odds-likelihood inference methods produced inconsistent distributions in which all hypotheses were ass igned a belief of zero. Consequently, these two cases were removed from the study.
VII. Results
Decision-theoretic ratings for five different procedures fo r determining a diagnosis are shown in Tab le 1.
"In fo rmed gold standard" refers to the procedure of prescrib ing the disease that maximizes utility under the distri bution used to derive the informed gold standard (Equa tion 10). "Simple Bayes-MEU" refers to the procedure of prescribing the disease that maximizes utility under the simple Bayes distribution. "Simple BayeS," "Odds likelihood," and "Dempster-Sh afer" refer to the proce dures of prescribing the most likely diseases under the simple Bayes, odds-likelihood, and Dempster-Shafer dis tributions, respectively.
The values in the first column represent the absolute decrease in utility of a patient when faced with the result or a lymph-node biopsy and diagnosed using a particu lar approach . The values represent an · average over the 26 cases examined, weighted by the likelihood of occur rence of each case. Notice that most of the decrease in each case is attributed to the fa ct that the patient is sick.
Errors in diagnosis account for little of the decrease in util ity. In particular, the rating ass ociated with the informed gold standard represents the decrease "in utility ass ociated with the best possible diagnosis under the conditions of the experiment6 and therefore reflects solely the decrease in utility of the patient due to illness . This rating shows that a patient with a lymph-node biopsy fa ces a decrease in utility of 205,804 micromorts, on average. That is, the patient is as ' bad off as he wo uld be fa cing a 0.2 chance of immediate, painless death. This quantity dominates the decreases in utility due to diagnostic error.
To highlight the effects of diagnost ic error, differences between the informed gold standard rating and the rat ing fo r each diagnostic ap proach are shown in column 2 of Table 1. The standard deviation of these differences is given in column 3 of the table. Note that the standard deviations are quite large relative to the mean differences.
The reason fo r such large variances is easily appreciated .
For each diagnostic approach, the diagnosis prescribed by the approach is identical to the diagnosis prescribed by the gold standard in many of the 24 cases. In particular, the simple Bayes-MEU, simple Bayes, and od ds-likelihood 55-the diacuaoion in Subsection IV.A. Table 2 : Expert ratings of the inference methods.
Decision-theoretic ratings (micro morts)
Differences
approaches prescribe the gold-standard diagnosis in 17 of 24 cases. 7 The naive Dempster-Shafer approach pre scribes the gold-standard diagnosis in 12 of 24 cases. In these cases, the ratings for the gold standard and inference methods are equal. In the remaining cases, the approaches prescribe a diagnosis that differs from th� gold standard prescription. These nonoptiinal diagnoses ' are often asso ciated with utilities that are significantly lower than is the utility associated with the gold-standard diagnosis. Thus, differences in. utility fluctuate from zero in many cases to large values in others, resulting in large standard devia tions.
Although the standard deviations are high, a. Monte
Carlo permutation test indicates that the performance of the naive Dempster-Shafe r approach is signifi cantly infe rior to that of the other me thods (achieved significance level = 0.004). No other significant difference exists among the other methods.
The expert ratings fo r each inference me thod are shown in Table 2 . As in the decision-theoretic approach, the mean and standard deviation are weighted by the rel ative prior probability of the true diagnosis. Bec.ause the ratings apply directly to the belief distributions derived by each method, there is no distinction between the sim ple Bayes-MEU and simple Bayes procedures.
Using the expert-rating metric, another �ignificant dif fe rence is detected. In particular, a Wilcoxon two-sample rank test shows that the simple Bayes inference procedure performs signifi cantly better than does the odds-likelihood approach (achieved significance level = 0.07). 
VIII. Discussion
Before examining the results in detail , it is useful to make some general comments about the two evaluation metrics. An obvious advantage of the decision-theoretic approach over the expert-rating approach is that its results are much more me aningful. Fo r example, the difference between the simple Bayes and naive Dempster-Shafer ratings us ing the expert-rating metric is 8.5 on a scale fr om 0 to 10 and is deemed to be "significant" by a standard sta tistical test. The difference of approximately 10,000 mi cromorts between the two approaches as determined by the decision-theoretic metric, however, carries much more fo rce; it implies that using the naive Dempster-Shafer ap proach instead of the simple Bayes approach is equivalent to assuming, an additional one in 100 chance of death! A disad, vantage of the decision-theor etic with respect to the expert-rating ap proach is that its results have lim ited scope. Specifically, the differences among inference methods may be highly dependent on the assessments of diagnostic utility made by our exp ert. Furthermore, decision-theoretic comparisons of ' inference methods are likely to vary fr om one domain to another because there is room fo r wide variation in utility assessments between do mains. The results of the experimental comparison mu st be considered in this light.
An advantage of the expert-rating metric over the decision-theoretic metric, as demonstrated in this exper iment, is that the former can be much more sensitive to differences. For example, the decision-theoretic ratings of the simple Bayes and of the odds-likelihood methods are Table 3 : Decision-theoretic ratings of exp ert distributions.
identical. In contrast, the expert-rating metric shows the two inference methods to be significantly different. High sensitivity is likely to be a property of the expert-rating approach acr068 many domains. In a typical consulting sess ion, an exp,e rt is hypersensitive to errors in diagnosis, whether such errors matter to a decision maker or not, be cause the integrity of the expert is on the line. It is likely that this hypersensitivity will carry over into expert-rating ratings of diagnostic performance. This advantage of us ing an expert-rating metric is not absolute. Considerations of integrity or li ability, fo r example, can always be incor porated into the diagnostic utilities. Indeed, the fa ct that components of preference can be made explicit and are un der the direct control of the expert is one advantage of the decision-theoretic approach.
Another advantage of the expert-rating me tric is that it is less time-consuming to implement. It took our expert approximately 20 hours, working with two people trained in decision analytic techniques, to develop the utility model used in this evaluation. It took our expert less than 1 minute per case to rate the distributions produced by the three inference methods.
Overall , the two approaches are complementary. The exp ert-rating approach is useful fo r identifying differences in performance that may be important in some domain.
The decision-theoretic metric reveals the degree of impor tance of such differences for a particular domain of in terest. It should be mentioned that information-theoretic metrics ex ist fo r measuring differences between probabil ity distributions, such as relative entropy and the Brier score (Ben-Bassat, 1978] (Spiegelhalter, !986]. The ad vantages and disadvantages of the information-theoretic and expert-rating methods are similar with respect to the decision-theoretic ap proach, excep t that the information theoretic methods require probabilistic interpretations fo r the distributions to be compared.
Given these considerations about the evaluation met tics, differences in performance among the inference meth ods can now be discussed. In this experimental compar ison, the method fo r selecting an optimal diagnosis with the highest decision-theoretic rank is simple Bayes-MEU. The difference between the rank of this method and the gold standard is 811 micromorts. With the caveats de scribed previously, this value can be seen to represent the maximum room fo r improvement in the knowledge base.
Such improvements may include more careful assessments of probabilities in the knowledge base, and the representa tion of dependencies among fe atures.
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The difference in ratings between simple Bayes-MEU Third, there is a regularity in the differences between the distributions produced by the two methods. Specifi cally, the simple Bayes distributions produced in this study are, with only one exception, more peaked. That is, the variance of these distributions are smaller than are those produced using the odds-likelihood approach . This differ ence can be traced to the additional assumption of con di tional independence on the negation of hypotheses, Equa-tion 2. To see this connection, consider a hypothetical ' example in which there are three mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses-Ht . H2 , and Hs-that have equal prior probabilities. Suppose there are many pieces of ev idence relevant to these hypotheses such that each piece of evidence E; has the same probability of occurrence for a given hypothesis. That is, p(E; IH,) = p(EIH, ) fo r all E; , and i = 1, 2, 3. Also suppose that the likelihoods have values such that: These constraints are satisfied easily (for example, p(EIHt ) = 0.8, p(EIH2) = 0.6, and p(EIHs) = 0.2). Un der these conditions, evidence E is confirmatory for H 1 , confirmatory to a lesse r degree fo r H2, and disconfirma tory fo r Ha . Using the simple Bayes inference procedure (Equation 3) it can be shown that, as the number of pieces of evidence grows, the posterior probability of H1 tends to one whereas the posterior probability of both H2 and Ha tends to zero. However, using the odds-likelihood ap proach (Equation 4) where evidence is conditionally inde . pendent given the negation of hypotheses, a different result is obtained. In particular, as the number of pieces of evi dence grows, it can be shown that the posterior probabili ties of both H1 and H2 tend to one, whereas the posterior probability of Ha tends to zero. In the odds-likelihood ap proach, these probabilities are renormalized, so the proba bilities of H1 and H2 each approach one-half. Thus, in this example, the odds-likelihood distribution is less peaked than is the simple Bayes distribution. In general, sim ple Bayes distributions will be more peaked, because this method tends to amplify differences in likelihoods, whereas the odds-likelihood method tends to wash out differences.
Unlike previous observations, this one does not ap pear to be tied to the lymph-node domain. Provided a large body of evidence is reported such that the simple Bayes approach produces a sharp distribution, the odds likelihood inference method will, in general, produce distri butions that are less peaked. An important consequence of this phenomenon is that degradation in performance due to the incorrect assumption of conditional independence on the negation of hypotheses is likely to occur in other domains.
A final observation about the simple Bayes and. odds likelihood inference methods is that there is a regularity among the exceptional cases (5 of 24) in which distribu tions produced by odds-likelihood were preferred to the those produced by simple Bayes. Although obvious depen dencies among fe atur� were captured by a clustering tech-nique, subtle ones remained unrepresented in the lymph node knowledge base. It seems that the fa ilure to represent the more subtle dependencies led to decreased performance of the simple Bayes method relative to the odds-likelihood method. In particular, the incorrect assumption of con ditional independence in the simple Bayes approach led to overcounting of evidential support. This overcounting, in tum, produced distributions that were overly peaked. In the odds-likelihood approach, the impact of evidence ·w as also overcounted. However, it appears that such over counting was partially compensated by the wash out effect described.
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The performances of the odds-likelihood and naive Dempster-Shafe r approaches are also interesting to com pare. Both evaluation metrics revealed a significant dif ference between the two methods. There are two major theoretical differences between the inference procedures, one or both of which may be responsible for the differ ences in performance. First, from Equation 8, it is clear that each mass assignment in the ·inference method con tains a component proportional to the prior probability of diseases. Tl:ius, when the mass es for many different ob servations are combined, the prior probability components will be · overcounted. Priors are not overcounted in the odds-likelihood approach. Second, due to the way mass is ass igned in the naive Dempster-Shafer approach, disconfir matory observations fo r disease hypotheses are not recog nized. For example, if some observation completely rules out a disease hypothesis in the odds-likelihood method, the Dempster-Shafe r mass fo r the disease-observation pair is zero. In the naive Dempster-Shafer inference method, a zero mass leaves the score of a hypothesis unchanged. Therefore, a hypothesis ruled out by an observation in the odds-likelihood approach is left with its degree of belief unchanged in the naive Dempster-Shafer approach. It is suspected that this difference is more significant than is the overcounting of priors.
IX. Fut ure Wo rk
The combination of the decision-theoretic and expert rating approaches to performance evaluation provides use fu l insights about various components of the inference pro cess within the lymph node domain and about the inference process in general. This same approach to evaluation can be used to probe many different aspects of the construction of an expert·system. For example, the Pathfinder research team has developed a set of procedures that recommends additional fe atures fo r observation to the pathologist-user. The methods discussed in this paper should prove useful in evaluating the merits of these procedures. In addition, the Pathfinder group is currently exploring different techniques for constructing consensus knowledge bases that combine the beliefs of two or more experts. Again, the evalua tion methods can be used to quantify the value of each approach. In yet another study, sensitivity to assessment errors in the knowledge base could be examined. It is hoped that the presentation of these evaluation methods will encourage other researchers to evaluate a wide variety of issues surrounding the building of real world expert systems.
X. Acknowledgements
I thank Eric Horvitz for his ass istance with the ass essment of the diagnostic utilities; Bharat Nathwani, the expert on the Pathfinder project, for his contributions to the con struction and evaluation of the system; and Doyen Nguyen fo r her painstaking work to identify features under the mi croscope. Eric Horvitz and Gregory Cooper critiqued a draft of this manuscript. Support fo r this work was pro vided by the National Library of Medicine under grant R01-LM04529, by the National Science Foundation under grant IRI-8703710, and by NASA-Ames. A portion of the computing resources was provided by the SUMEX-AIM resource under NIH grant RR-00785.
